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Abstract
This paper provides an explanation of the reason why pre-
vious works suggest that the effect of fiscal stimulus measure
is, if any, small during the lost decades in Japan. To show
this, it focuses on public investment by local governments
which occupies a substantial portion of the total investment.
Specifically, we divide it into subsidized and non-subsidized
expense, and empirically study the differences between their
decision-making processes from the perspective of fiscal stim-
ulus measures. The results of this analysis reveal that subsi-
dized expense is countercyclical to the economic situation of
the nation as a whole, but on the other hand, no connection
with business cycles is seen at prefectural level. Contrastingly,
non-subsidized expense shows no reaction to the state of the
macro economy. In the 2000s, in particular, it is shown to be
procyclical in relation to economic fluctuation at prefectural
level, due to the fiscal rigidity of local governments. Based
on the fact that the majority of Japan’s public investment is
carried out by local governments, it becomes clear that, as
a problem prior to the evaluation of its policy effects, public
investment is not implemented with adequate timing to offset
business cycles in the first place.
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1 Introduction
There have already been many precedent research studies on public investment as a
fiscal stimulus measure in Japan, but most of these analyze without distinguishing
between public investment by the central government and that by local governments.
As is well known, public investment has played a central role in Japan’s fiscal stim-
ulus measures, but policy on public investment aimed at economic stabilization has
been implemented through national fiscal stimulus measures using public works bud-
gets, and fiscal stimulus measures by local governments using ordinary construction
expenditure. In other words, in Japan’s fiscal policy, not only does the central gov-
ernment give guidelines on local finances by formulating the Local Public Finance
Program (the fiscal plans of local governments), but incentives for fiscal stimulus
measures by local governments have also been given by means of funding measures
through intergovernmental fiscal transfers, including Local Allocation Tax and na-
tional treasury disbursements.1
However, since individual revenues and expenditures in local finances are decided
independently based on their respective budgetary constraints, it is not necessarily
clear whether local governments have implemented fiscal stimulus measures in line
with the Local Public Finance Program or other national policy. Even if the central
government has set out fiscal stimulus measures and the government’s policy has
been indicated in the Local Public Finance Program, depending on the state of
local finances, fiscal stimulus measures have not necessarily have been implemented
coherently at central and local level.
As Miyazaki (2008) and others also state, if public investment is understood in
terms of public capital formation in SNA (System of National Accounts), in Japan
more than 80% of public investment by general governments has been implemented
at local level. Consequently, when investigating trends in Japan’s public invest-
ment, it is important to evaluate public investment by local governments. However,
as shown by the precedent research summarized in Section 2 below, there has been no
research demonstrating explicitly how public investment by local governments has
reacted to economic fluctuation. In particular, public investment by local govern-
ments is divided into subsidized and non-subsidized public works expenses (hereafter
subsidized and non-subsidized expenses), which are contrasting in nature, and local
government decision-making on these is not necessarily uniform. Therefore, local
government reactions to the economy should be evaluated from the perspective of
fiscal stimulus measures divided into subsidized and non-subsidized expense. How-
ever, there is no existing research that attempts a verification from this perspective.
Given this background, this paper uses statistical analysis techniques to study
empirically how fiscal stimulus measures have been implemented by the central and
local governments.2 As a result of the analysis, we assert that, since the 1990s, local
governments have not necessarily made fiscal expenditures in line with national
1The roles of the Local Public Finance Program include (1) ensuring consistency with state
finances, the national economy, etc., (2) guaranteeing local funding so that local governments can
ensure standard administrative levels, and (3) indicating the principles of financial management by
local authorities. The positioning of Local Public Finance Program within fiscal stimulus measures
can be seen as an indicative role of national principles.
2The framework is based on our preliminary note (Funashima, Horiba and Miyahara, 2013).
The present work essentially differs from the previous one in that (1) the model specification here
builds on the related literature and (2) the sample period includes the 1990s as well as the 2000s
and a comparison of them is conducted.
2
policy. From the beginning of the 2000s, in particular, non-subsidized expense is
shown to be procyclical in relation to economic fluctuation at prefectural level, and
this is attributed to the fiscal rigidity of local governments. Based on the fact that
the majority of Japan’s public investment is implemented by local governments,
it will be revealed that, as a problem prior to the evaluation of its policy effects,
investment is not implemented with adequate timing to offset business cycles in
the first place. As suggested in Bayoumi (2001), Ihori et al. (2003), Bru¨ckner and
Tuladhar (2010), and others, it follows that the effect of fiscal stimulus measure is,
if any, small during the lost decades in Japan.
In Section 2 below, we will give an overview of previous empirical studies and
define the position of this study. In Section 3, as a target of ordinary construction
expenditure, public investment by local governments is divided into subsidized and
non-subsidized expense. The linkage between these and business cycles will then
be verified from the perspective of fiscal plans and settled accounts of local govern-
ments. In Section 4, panel data for each prefecture will be used to estimate a public
investment function, central and local government decision-making on business cy-
cles will be investigated, and the difference between the two will be examined. In
Section 5, finally, the main conclusions of this paper will be stated and issues for
the future touched upon.
2 Related Literature
Japan’s public investment policy has already been subject to plenty of empirical
research from various perspectives. Here, we survey precedent research and define
the position and characteristics of this study. Previous works can be divided into two
types, one gauging the policy effects of public investment and the other examining
the determinant factors behind it. In the following, existing research demonstrating
the economic effects of public investment will first be summarized.
2.1 Policy Effects of Public Investment
The economic effects ensuing from public investment can be organized by dividing
them into two aspects, namely demand and supply.3 That is, from the demand
side, investment is expected to produce a leveling of business cycles as a macro
stabilization policy. From the aspect of supply, meanwhile, public capital formed by
cumulative public investment is thought to have the effect of expanding production
levels. The latter is known as the production (productivity) effect of public capital,
and has already been the subject of numerous empirical analyses in relation to Japan
(e.g., Mera, 1973). These trends have not only involved the productivity of public
capital from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole; through estimation based on
data for each region, studies of the interregional distribution of public capital have
also been actively undertaken. Attempts to gauge the degree to which this public
capital contributes to production or economic growth have also been undertaken in
recent years, accompanied by a greater refinement of estimation methods.
3In terms of temporal perspectives, the demand aspect and the supply aspect correspond to the
short and long term, respectively. Moreover, public investment plays a variety of roles, and can
also be arranged in correspondence to the three functions of government finance.
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Also, as stated in Doi and Ihori (2009), among others, public investment in Japan
has been used actively as a fiscal stimulus measure or means of discretionary fiscal
policy. Similarly, many analyses focusing on Japan have already empirically verified
the effectiveness of public investment as a macro stabilization policy. However, in
precedent research it has been pointed out that this effect has declined since the
1990s (e.g. Bayoumi, 2001; Ihori et al., 2003). In recent years, moreover, research
to gauge the impact of public investment on regional business cycles has been pro-
gressing. Of those concerned with Japan, studies by Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010),
Kondo (2011), Miyazaki (2011), Miyazaki and Kondo (2012) may be mentioned.
Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010) estimate a government expenditure multiplier
based on data for each region, and show that the value of this fell throughout the
1990s. Kondo (2011), by measuring impulse response based on the vector auto
regression (VAR) model, points out that fiscal outlays in the form of government
consumption and public investment have had a small impact on local economies,
particularly since the 1990s. Some points are shared by Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar
(2010) and Kondo (2011); for example, they both divide samples into those before
and those after 1990 for comparison and study, and show that the effectiveness
of fiscal expenditure has decreased since 1990; moreover, their analysis is aimed
at government consumption in addition to public investment. In Miyazaki (2011)
and Miyazaki and Kondo (2012), data from 1990 to 2007 are analyzed to estimate
the public investment policy shock at prefectural level. Here, public investment is
shown to amplify business cycles in local economies. In Japan, there has not been
enough research using econometric methods in an attempt to estimate the short-
term impact of fiscal expenditure on local economies. In view of this point, the
results produced by Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010), Kondo (2011), Miyazaki (2011),
Miyazaki and Kondo (2012) in actually evaluating the impact of public investment
on local economies are regarded as significant.
Incidentally, many of the precedent research studies mentioned above have an-
alyzed public investment without distinguishing between national and local invest-
ment. By contrast, Miyazaki and Kondo (2012) use data on public investment by
local governments to conduct the same empirical analysis as Miyazaki (2011). They
point out that public investment by local governments has amplified the scale of
business cycles at local level. Also, in Miyazaki (2008, 2009a, b), public investment
is separated into that by the central government and that by local governments,
and the VAR model is used to verify and compare the impulse response in each.
The results show that, although public investment by the central government has
an impact on production or employment, no impact of public investment by local
governments can be recognized.
As shown above, several attempts to investigate the effect of public investment
by local governments have been made in recent years, but they have evidently yet
to reach an adequately cumulative level.
2.2 Determinant Factors behind Public Investment
Next, precedent research that empirically analyzes the factors impacting Japan’s
public investment policy and fiscal expenditure decision-making will be summa-
rized. There have been numerous examples, both in Japan and abroad, of empirical
research based on estimating a policy reaction function, as well as other attempts to
elucidate determinant factors behind public investment or government expenditure.
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However, because the objectives of analysis are diverse, the formulation of econo-
metric models assumed in these is extremely wide-ranging. Firstly, some existing
research demonstrates that political factors have an influence on decision-making
in public investment policy. For example, Doi (1998) and Kondo (2008) are among
the cases of precedent research based on macro data from Japan. Doi (1998) and
Kondo (2008) take account of an election dummy as an explanatory variable, in or-
der to investigate the correlation between fiscal expenditure and national elections.
Meanwhile, Kondo (2008) uses panel data for each prefecture to estimate a model
with political factors added as an explanatory variable. He asserts that there is po-
litical influence over decision-making in public investment policy, at both national
and local level.
On the other hand, if based on the role of public investment as macro stabi-
lization policy, public investment is thought to react strongly to economic fluctu-
ation. Although this is also a focus of the present research, precedent research
expressly investigating the reaction of fiscal expenditure to business cycles is limited
to Kitasaka (2008) and Funashima (2013), among others.4 Kitasaka (2008) posits
a Markov-switching model to formulate a government expenditure function based
on economic indicators and fiscal deficits, and investigates regime change in terms
of a chronological sequence in the reaction of government expenditure. Funashima
(2013) posits a policy reaction function using panel data for each prefecture, based
on similar analytical methods to those of Sorensen et al. (2001), Lane (2003), Hines
(2010), Afonso and Jalles (2013). As a result, while Japan’s public investment has
been discussed as a fiscal stimulus measure in awareness of the economic state of the
country as a whole, it is shown that the economic disparity between regions has not
been taken into account. This is thought to support Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010),
Kondo (2011), Miyazaki (2011), Miyazaki and Kondo (2012), whose findings were
skeptical of the short-term effect of public investment on local economies.
Although attempts to investigate the government’s reaction to economic fluctu-
ation have been made in this way, there are still issues remaining in the existing
research. Funashima (2013) points out that Japan’s public investment is counter-
cyclical to economic fluctuation in the country as a whole but procyclical to economic
fluctuation at local level, but nevertheless does not adequately elucidate the reasons
for this. One such reason, as stated by Higo and Nakagawa (2001), is thought to
be that local non-subsidized expense is procyclical to economic fluctuation at pre-
fectural level. Also, as discussed by Miyazaki (2008), it is conceivable that fiscal
stimulus measures formulated under government initiatives are not necessarily ac-
tivated according to plan in non-subsidized expense where local discretion is more
easily brought into play. Such points have yet to be analyzed sufficiently, however,
and detailed empirical research will need to be accumulated. In this research, the
focus is on the actions of local governments in fiscal stimulus measures. By positing
a policy reaction function for each of subsidized and non-subsidized investment, the
reason why public investment is procyclical to local economic fluctuation will be
empirically studied.
4Doi (1998) and Kondo (2008), though taking account of growth rate as an explanatory variable
of the policy reaction function, offer no interpretation of the estimation results. In their studies,
therefore, the growth rate is thought to be positioned merely as a control variable. Meanwhile,
Funashima (2012) examines the correlation between Japan’s government expenditure and business
cycles within the framework of frequency domain analysis, and shows that public investment is
countercyclical to business cycles.
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The relative positions of the above-mentioned precedent research and this re-
search are arranged in Table 1.
3 Fiscal Stimulus Measures and Public Invest-
ment by Local Governments
In terms of economic nature categories, the expenditure of local governments is di-
vided into mandatory expenditure, investment expenditure, and other expenditure.
Of these, fiscal stimulus measures can be perceived as being based on investment
expenditure. When considering public investment by local governments in relation
to fiscal stimulus measures, the discussion is usually based on ordinary construction
expenditure.
Incidentally, the Cabinet prepares forecasts of total revenues and expenditures
by local governments for the following fiscal year, and submits them to the National
Diet, in accordance with Article 7 of the Local Allocation Tax Act. These forecasts
of overall local finances for the following fiscal year are known as the Local Public
Finance Program, or more specifically, the initial Local Public Finance Program.
After supplementary budgets and other changes have been made to these initial
fiscal plans, the Local Public Finance Program corresponding to settled accounts
are called the revised Local Public Finance Program.
When the central government implements fiscal stimulus measures, funding mea-
sures are taken at the same time as the government’s policy is indicated, to ensure
that economic adjustment policies are implemented in line with government policy
on local finances. As such, the central and local governments work together to im-
plement fiscal stimulus measures. In this process, the policy on local government in
relation to fiscal stimulus measures for each fiscal year has been shown in the Local
Public Finance Program. That is, the Local Public Finance Program are seen as
a signal to local governments concerning national fiscal stimulus measures. Specif-
ically, central government policy on fiscal stimulus measures by local governments
is indicated as the stated amount of ordinary construction expenditure in the Local
Public Finance Program. Central government policy on fiscal stimulus measures to
be implemented by local governments in the next fiscal year is indicated as the Local
Public Finance Program at the beginning of the fiscal year, and central policy on
fiscal stimulus measures including supplementary budgets is shown in the revised
Local Public Finance Program. On the other hand, ordinary construction expen-
diture actually transferred to implementation is the amount finally accounted by
the local authority (settlement accounts), and does not necessarily concur with the
amount in the Local Public Finance Program. Comparing the amounts finally ac-
counted by local authorities and the amounts in the Local Public Finance Program
enables us to examine how the central and local governments have collaborated in
implementing fiscal stimulus measures.
When comparing the Local Public Finance Program with their settled accounts,
however, adjustments need to be made, as it is not possible to make simple compar-
isons, depending on the characteristics of each respective set of figures. That is, the
Local Public Finance Program are the forecast amounts of revenues and expenditures
in local finances for the next fiscal year, and are seen as collective fiscal projections
for a standard local authority in the next fiscal year; they do not project single
fiscal year revenues and expenditures on a budgetary basis. Therefore, amounts of
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revenues and expenditures pertaining to deferred projects or supplementary budgets
are not recorded in the initial Local Public Finance Program. On the other hand,
because the amounts of deferred projects and supplementary budgets are included
in settled accounts, to make a simple comparison, they are characterized in that
final amounts in the Ordinary Accounts are greater than those in the Local Public
Finance Program. For the above-mentioned reasons, to compare the Local Public
Finance Program with settled accounts, they are adjusted to the Local Public Fi-
nance Program and the settled accounts of Ordinary Accounts, respectively, and the
amounts of the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts
are calculated. Specific revisions include the following items.
• Since the categories of revenue and expenditure amounts in the Local Public
Finance Program and settled Ordinary Accounts are not the same, categories
need to be adjusted. For example, adjustment is made between ordinary
construction expenditure, disaster restoration expenditure and unemployment
measures expenditure in the type categories of settled Ordinary Accounts,
and investment expenditure (subsidized, non-subsidized) in the Local Public
Finance Program.
• Because supplementary budgets are not accounted in the Local Public Finance
Program, the revised budget portion is added. As increases accompanying sup-
plementary budgets in the middle of a fiscal year, revenues as well as increases
in national treasury disbursements, municipal bonds, etc., and increases in
the relevant expenditures are necessary for the amounts in the Local Public
Finance Program.
• Because amounts brought forward from the previous fiscal year are not ac-
counted in the Local Public Finance Program, adjustments are made. Adjust-
ments are also made for excess taxation, reserves, etc. For example, amounts
brought forward from the previous fiscal year are deducted from settled Ordi-
nary Accounts and adjusted with the Local Public Finance Program.
Programs adjusted in this way are called the revised Local Public Finance Pro-
gram, and settled accounts are called revised settled accounts. These are published
every fiscal year by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.5 As or-
dinary construction amounts, subsidized expenses amounts and non-subsidized ex-
penses amounts, the figures in the diagrams below are the amounts in the initial
Local Public Finance Program, the revised Local Public Finance Program and re-
vised settled accounts after these adjustments have been made.
3.1 Fiscal Stimulus Measures and Ordinary Construction
Ordinary Construction Expenditure
Fig. 1 shows local ordinary construction expenditure as the total of non-subsidized
expense and subsidized expense. Table 2, meanwhile, shows the Local Public Fi-
nance Program (initial and revised) and revised settled accounts for ordinary con-
struction as a whole from FY1985 to FY2008.
5Miyazaki (2008) uses the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts
to discuss the characteristics of subsidized and non-subsidized expense, but the initial Local Public
Finance Program is outside the scope of analysis. Moreover, the correlation between these and
business cycles is not verified.
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Viewing the year-on-year increase in ordinary construction expenditure shown
in Fig. 1 (a), ordinary construction expenditure in the revised Local Public Finance
Program appears to have generally increased in periods of economic recession, shown
by the shading.6 On the rate of increase in ordinary construction expenditure, more-
over, the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts followed
similar trends in the 1990s, while the initial Local Public Finance Program showed
different trends. However, a change in these trends occurred from the beginning of
the 2000s, when, if anything, it was initial and the revised Local Public Finance
Program that started to follow the same trends. To put it differently, of the three,
the initial Local Public Finance Program showed different trends in the 1990s, while
revised settled accounts came to show different trends from the beginning of the
2000s. In other words, from the beginning of the 2000s, it is possible that some kind
of change occurred in Japan’s measures for fiscal stimulus via local finances.
As for the actual amounts for ordinary construction shown in Fig. 1 (b), the
revised Local Public Finance Program showed an increasing trend up to FY1993, re-
mained on a par with alternating increases and decreases for five years from FY1994
to FY1998, and have decreased since then. In other words, in terms of local fis-
cal stimulus measures in the 1990s, we find that the initial Local Public Finance
Program did not change significantly, but that the revised Local Public Finance Pro-
gram and settled accounts changed significantly or to the same degree. Conversely,
everything turned to a decrease from the beginning of the 2000s, and revised settled
accounts, in particular, fell greatly compared to initial and the revised Local Public
Finance Program.
From this, the revised Local Public Finance Program suggests that fiscal stimulus
measures using local finances were actively promoted as a national policy in the
1990s. Figures in settled accounts also point to the implementation of fiscal stimulus
measures commensurate with this. On the other hand, not only has there been a
lack of planned active fiscal stimulus measures since the beginning of the 2000s,
but also, in the figures in some local settled accounts, even the amounts in those
reduced programs have been unachievable. In other words, owing to the harsh
fiscal circumstances of local finances, even local fiscal stimulus measures indicated
in the Local Public Finance Program are thought to have become difficult since the
beginning of the 2000s.
The Initial Local Public Finance Program, the Revised Local Public Fi-
nance Program and Revised Settled Accounts
Fig. 2 shows scatter diagrams of the rates of increase in the initial Local Public
Finance Program, the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled
accounts for each of non-subsidized expense, subsidized expense and ordinary con-
struction expenditure. For example, the second column in the first row of Fig. 2
(a) shows a scatter diagram for the rates of increase in initial and the revised Local
Public Finance Program in non-subsidized expense.
Firstly, viewing Fig. 2 (c) on the aforementioned ordinary construction expen-
diture, we find there to be a strong positive correlation between rates of increase in
6The rate of increase rose sharply in FY1995, even though it was a period of economic expansion.
This was due to special circumstances, in that public works for recovery and reconstruction were
implemented in Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures following the occurrence of the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake of January 17th, 1995.
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the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts. Also, it can
be again be reaffirmed that the correlation between the initial Local Public Finance
Program and revised settled accounts is low.
Next, in the scatter diagrams for rates of increase in non-subsidized expense
and subsidized expense shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), while for non-subsidized ex-
pense a strong positive correlation is shown between initial and the revised Local
Public Finance Program, for subsidized expense a strong positive correlation may
be confirmed between revised settled accounts and the revised Local Public Finance
Program. This would suggest that the positive correlation between the revised Local
Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts in ordinary construction, seen
above, is caused by subsidized expense. On the other hand, compared to subsidized
expense, revised settled accounts deviate from the revised Local Public Finance Pro-
gram in the rate of increase in ordinary construction expenditure. This is due to the
fact that, in non-subsidized expense, the positive correlation between the revised
Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts is relatively weak.
From the above, it may be posited that local governments have implemented
fiscal stimulus measures for subsidized expense in line with the central government’s
fiscal programs, in relation to national fiscal stimulus measures shown in the revised
Local Public Finance Program, but for non-subsidized expense, they have not im-
plemented or have not been able to implement fiscal stimulus measures according
to program.
3.2 Fiscal Stimulus Measures and Subsidized Expense
Table 3 shows the initial Local Public Finance Program, the revised Local Public
Finance Program and revised settled accounts for subsidized expense from FY1985
to FY2008. Fig. 3 shows (a) the rate of year-on-year increase and (b) the subsidized
expense amount of each. On the rate of increase for this subsidized expense, the
revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts show almost the
same trends. On this point, the scatter diagrams in Fig. 2 above also show, in row
3 column 2 related to (b) subsidized expense (row 2 column 3), a strong correlation
between the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts.
These results reveal, in connection with subsidized expense, that local governments
are implementing subsidized expense for the sake of fiscal stimulus measures, in line
with the revised Local Public Finance Program indicating the national policy on
fiscal stimulus measures. Of course, this must result from the fact that local govern-
ments are able to implement subsidized expense for fiscal stimulus measures thanks
to government subsidies for subsidized expense and the accompanying funding mea-
sures. Therefore, for the subsidized expense that comprises ordinary construction
expenditure, it is clear that fiscal stimulus measures have been implemented at the
local stage as well, in response to national policies.
3.3 Fiscal Stimulus Measures and Local Non-subsidized Ex-
pense
Fig. 4 shows trends in local non-subsidized expense, while Table 4 shows the Local
Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts for non-subsidized expense
between FY1985 and FY2008. As seen in Fig. 4, characteristic features of non-
subsidized expense are that it differs significantly from the subsidized expense men-
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tioned earlier, in that the trends of initial and the revised Local Public Finance
Program are the same, and that, if anything, the figures in the settled accounts
show different trends. Viewing this in terms of the scatter diagrams shown above,
characteristic features revealed by the scatter diagrams on the rate of increase in
non-subsidized expense in Fig. 2 (a) are that initial and the revised Local Public
Finance Program show a very strong correlation, and that the rates of increase in
the revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts do not show
a very strong correlation. A particularly characteristic point is that revised settled
accounts have shown different trends since the 1990s. In other words, in terms of
the amounts of non-subsidized expense, initial fiscal plans, revised fiscal plans and
revised settled accounts have all shown a decrease since about 1995. However, the
decrease is clearly greater in the settled account figures, and the degree of decrease in
initial and the revised Local Public Finance Program is smaller than that of revised
settled accounts. This shows that local governments did not implement investment
to a sufficient amount, compared to the revised Local Public Finance Program in-
dicating the central government’s policy on fiscal stimulus measures. Moreover,
focusing on the execution rate in Table 4, we find that this figure was below 70%
from the beginning of the 2000s. In other words, particularly since the 2000s, it
can be interpreted that, based on the independent judgment of local governments,
the non-subsidized expense they implemented has vastly underperformed national
programs.
3.4 Ordinary Construction Expenditure and Business Cy-
cles
In the foregoing, historical trends in the initial Local Public Finance Program, the
revised Local Public Finance Program and revised settled accounts for ordinary
construction, non-subsidized expense and subsidized expense have been examined.
Next, the focus will turn to the relationship between the rate of increase in revised
settled accounts for ordinary construction expenditure and the state of the economy.
Table 5 (a) shows the correlation coefficients between the indexes of business
conditions and the rates of increase in initial programs, revised programs and re-
vised settled accounts for non-subsidized expense, subsidized expense and ordinary
construction expenditure, respectively. Here, CI is the rate of increase in composite
index (coincident index) and DI is diffusion index (coincident index). Moreover, t1,
t2 and t3 express the rates of year-on-year increase in initial programs, revised pro-
grams and revised settled accounts for non-subsidized expense, respectively, while
similarly h1, h2 and h3 and sum1, sum2 and sum3 correspond to the rates of increase
in subsidized expense and ordinary construction expenditure, respectively.
The above shows that, while public investment by local governments is confirmed
to have been implemented countercyclically to macro economic fluctuation to a cer-
tain extent, it has not been countercyclical enough, since non-subsidized expense has
not been implemented according to program. Meanwhile, coefficients of correlation
(with the exception of FY1995, the year of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
are shown in Table 5 (b), evidently providing an outcome that more clearly concurs
with the examination above.
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4 Empirical Analysis Based on Estimation of Pol-
icy Reaction Function
In the previous section, the characteristics of public investment by local governments
were discussed, with the focus mainly on differences between subsidized and non-
subsidized expense from a macro perspective. The results suggested by the analysis
in the previous section support the assertions of Miyazaki (2008, 2009a, b) that a
fiscal stimulus effect cannot be seen in public investment by local governments. In
other words, under the influence of non-subsidized expense, public investment by
local governments is not sufficiently countercyclical to the macro economy, and its
policy effects are therefore thought to be low.
In the previous section, as well as in Miyazaki (2008, 2009a, b), business cy-
cles in the country as a whole and public investment by local governments were
mainly studied on the basis of aggregated data. In recent years, however, attempts
have been made to verify the impact of public investment on local economies (e.g.
Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar, 2010; Kondo, 2011; Miyazaki, 2011; Miyazaki and Kondo,
2012). To attempt a more detailed analysis of fiscal stimulus measures by local
governments, it will be useful to have an appraisal based on information for each
region.
In this section, the correlation between business cycles and public investment in
individual regions will be empirically studied by using panel data for each prefecture
since the 1990s to estimate a public investment function. As was also stated earlier,
attempts have already been made to estimate a policy reaction function from various
angles, but there has been no research using econometric methods to indicate that
the reaction to economic fluctuation at regional level differs between subsidized and
non-subsidized expense. In the following, it will be shown that the reaction to
economic fluctuation at regional level is different for subsidized and non-subsidized
expense, and the causes behind this difference will be clarified. The analysis in the
previous section revealed that, particularly since the 2000s, there has been a serious
deviation between programs and settled accounts for non-subsidized expense. This
implies the possibility that some structural change in local government decision-
making occurred around the year 2000. Based on this point, the authors decided to
divide the sample period into the 1990s and the 2000s for estimation.7 The end of
the sample period was set at FY2007 to eliminate the impact of the Lehman shock.8
7As actual figures for real gross prefectural product, consistent data from the early 1990s to the
2000s are not available in the first place.
8The period from FY2000 to FY2007 straddles the 13th business cycle (Jan. 1999-Jan. 2002)
and 14th business cycle (Jan. 2002-March 2009), based on the“date of business cycles,” which is
determined by the Cabinet office for the Government of Japan. In fact, the majority of it overlaps
with the period of economic expansion in the 14th cycle (Jan. 2002-Feb. 2008). As is well known,
the period of economic expansion in the 14th cycle lasted 73 months, and was the longest such
period since the war. In other words, the 2000s, except FY2000 and FY2001, were a period of
economic expansion for Japan in terms of business cycles. In connection with this point, Artis
and Okubo (2011), using data on prefectural growth rates in Japan in 1955-1995, report that the
degree of economic harmony between prefectures differs according to the epoch in question. Since
the beginning of the 2000s, a considerable deviation in growth rates has arisen between prefectures.
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4.1 Estimation Models and Data
Linkage between public investment by local governments and business cycles will
be investigated by gauging the reaction of the logarithmic difference of public in-
vestment to that of production, in accordance with Lane (2003), Hines (2010), Fu-
nashima (2013) and others. As stated in section 2, the framework for empirical
analysis here is based on Funashima (2013), but in this analysis, the focus is on
public investment by local governments, with a clear distinction between subsidized
and non-subsidized expense. This makes it possible to investigate public investment
decision-making in greater detail from the perspective of local governments.
Specifically, on the policy reaction function of public investment, model (I) in-
cluding only individual effects (µi) is posited as follows:
∆ lnGit = α + β∆ lnYi,t−1 + z′t−1θ + µi + νit,
and model (II), including both individual effects (µi) and temporal effects (λt) is
posited as:
∆ lnGit = α + β∆ lnYi,t−1 + µi + λt + νit,
where ∆ expresses first difference.9
To investigate the reaction to the macro economy as well, a macroeconomic
index (zt) dependent only on time instead of temporal effects (λt) is included in
the explanatory variables in model (I). As in Kitasaka (2008), Funashima (2013)
and others, the focus was on zt as the single-level logarithmic difference between
gross domestic product and the government debt ratio. If public investment were
countercyclical to the economy at national level, the estimate for gross domestic
product would have to be negative. If investment were implemented with a view to
stabilizing the macro economy, it would be countercyclical to the economy of the
country as a whole. In other words, if the country as a whole were in recession, local
public investment could be expected to be in a generally increasing trend. Besides,
increases or decreases in fiscal deficits are thought to influence decision-making on
national public spending and have a negative impact on public investment.
The data used were as follows. For public investment as the dependent vari-
able, ordinary construction expenditure in the Local Finance Statistical Yearbook
(settled accounts data published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions) was used. For data on regional production, actual figures on gross prefectural
product in Prefectural Accounts (93SNA) (Cabinet Office) were used.10 However,
actual figures based on the fixed standard year method (1995 prices) were used for
the 1990s and those based on the index-linked method (2000 index-linked prices)
for the 2000s. Also, the GDP in National Accounts (93SNA) (Cabinet Office) was
9Formulation based on logarithmic difference is widely adopted in precedent research, and β
is used to approximate the reaction of the rate of increase in public investment to the growth
rate. Meanwhile, Sorensen et al. (2001) estimate a model using single-level difference not based
on logarithms.
10It should be borne in mind that the fiscal year data used here do not include information on
economic cycles over periods of less than one year. For example, Wall (2007) and others who used
quarterly data for the index of industrial production assert the existence of cross-regional differences
in the timing of economic cycles. In other words, although this prefectural growth rate contains
information on quantitative differences in regional economic cycles, it may not adequately reflect
differences in timing. Nevertheless, since regional statistics on public investment on a monthly and
quarterly basis are not provided, gross prefectural product is used as a proxy index for regional
economic cycles in this paper.
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used as an output index for the country as a whole, while actual figures based on
the index-linked method (2000 index-linked prices) were used for the 1990s and
those based on the index-linked method (2005 index-linked prices) for the 2000s.
The government debt ratio, an index of fiscal deficits, was created by dividing total
government debt (Bank of Japan) by nominal GDP in National Accounts (93SNA)
(Cabinet Office). In the estimates for the 1990s, meanwhile, a Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake dummy was added to the explanatory variables, with 1 for Osaka and
Hyogo Prefectures and 0 for others in FY1995. The purpose of this was to control
increases in public investment aimed at reconstruction support in these prefectures.
4.2 Estimation Results
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of estimation for the 1990s and the 2000s, respec-
tively. In both periods, fixed effect estimation was carried out for both models (I)
and (II). Below, the results of estimation for the 1990s will first be examined.
Viewing the estimation results on subsidized expense in Table 6, for gross pre-
fectural product, the βˆ symbol is different in models (I) and (II), and a result not
significantly differing from zero is produced. For gross domestic product and gov-
ernment debt ratio as macroeconomic indicators, conversely, the symbol condition
is satisfied and there is significance at the level of 1%. These results show that,
while subsidized expense generally moves countercyclically to economic fluctuation
in the country as a whole, it does not react to economic fluctuation at prefectural
level. That subsidized expense is countercyclical to the macro economy concurs with
the point already highlighted in the previous section, and is thought to strongly re-
flect the central government’s countercyclical decision-making. However, the results
obtained here imply that, while subsidized expense is countercyclical to macro eco-
nomic fluctuation uniformly across the nation, regional differences in this fluctuation
have not been factored in. To put it another way, no countercyclical behavior toward
economic fluctuation at prefectural level can be observed, and subsidized expense is
not implemented to stabilize or support local economies.
Next, viewing the non-subsidized expense estimation results in Table 6, although
the null hypothesis (β = 0) cannot be rejected for gross prefectural product, a posi-
tive estimate is obtained for both model (I) and model (II), and expenditure appears
to be linked procyclically to economic fluctuation at prefectural level. Meanwhile,
the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake dummy is only significant in model (I) for
non-subsidized expense, unlike for subsidized expense. This is thought to imply
that reconstruction support led by the government was positively undertaken via
subsidized expense.11 As for macroeconomic indicators, although the government
debt ratio is significantly negative, there is no significant result for gross domestic
product. Moreover, as was also indicated in the previous section, we find that non-
subsidized expense is not countercyclical to economic fluctuation at national level
and is not linked.
Now, let us examine the estimation results for the 2000s. Viewing the subsidized
expense estimation results in Table 7, the null hypothesis (β = 0) cannot be rejected
for gross prefectural product, just as in the 1990s; gross domestic product is signifi-
cantly negative, and the government debt ratio, albeit not significant, is a negative
11This point would also be consistent with Fig. 3 (a) and Fig. 4 (a) in the previous section. In
other words, in FY1995, the year of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the rate of growth in
subsidized expense was clearly larger than that in non-subsidized expense.
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estimate. On the other hand, the estimation results for non-subsidized expense show
that, unlike those for subsidized expense, gross prefectural product in both models is
positively significant at the 1% level. This means that non-subsidized expense reacts
procyclically to economic fluctuation at regional level. As for the reaction to the
macro economic environment, neither gross domestic product nor the government
debt ratio is significant, and the estimate is positive. The fact that non-subsidized
expense has no correlation to the state of the economy in the country as a whole,
in contrast to subsidized expense, was also found in the previous section, and the
same result could be said to have been obtained here. In view of the above, it is
thought that discretionary decision-making by local governments in line with eco-
nomic conditions at local level, rather than macro economic conditions, exerted a
strong impact, particularly for non-subsidized expense in the 2000s.
In Funashima (2013), a procyclical result to business cycles at prefectural level
was obtained because the policy reaction function was estimated using ordinary
construction expenditure totaled from subsidized expense, non-subsidized expense
and others as data on public investment. However, the interpretation of this was not
sufficiently stated. The results obtained in this analysis suggest that this is because
non-subsidized expense is procyclical.
4.3 Cause Analysis of Procyclical Non-subsidized Expense
Based on the analysis above, when seen at prefectural level, the reaction of pub-
lic investment to economic fluctuation clearly differs between subsidized and non-
subsidized expense; particularly in the 2000s, non-subsidized expense showed a pro-
cyclical reaction to economic fluctuation. Here, as the next topic, the reason why
non-subsidized expense became procyclical from the beginning of the 2000s will be
investigated.
As stated above, Higo and Nakagawa (2001) have already pointed out that the fis-
cal rigidity of local authorities lies behind the procyclical behavior of non-subsidized
expense toward economic fluctuation at prefectural level. In particular, following
a series of fiscal stimulus packages since the collapse of the bubble at the begin-
ning of the 1990s and reduced tax revenues associated with economic stagnation,
the freedom of local finances is thought to have suffered a serious decline in the
2000s. Fig. 5 shows the ordinary balance ratio plotted on the horizontal axis and
non-subsidized expense (unit: 1 billion yen) on the vertical axis for Japan’s 47 pre-
fectures from FY2000 to FY2007.12 But since the levels of non-subsidized expense
depend on scale and other factors for each prefecture, they have here been divided
into the following groups based on population scale as of 2005, and the difference in
levels is approximately controlled.
Although the population of Osaka Prefecture is more or less the same as that
of Kanagawa, it was split off and plotted as a separate Group (Group 2) because
a positive correlation was observed between its ordinary balance ratio and its non-
subsidized expense.
• Group 1 (Tokyo)
12The ordinary balance ratio is calculated as the proportion of general revenue resources allotted
to ordinary expenses such as personnel expenses, public assistance expenses, debt service and other
annually disbursed expenses. That is, a higher ordinary balance ratio means less flexibility of the
financial structure. For more details, see Ministry of International Affairs and Communications
(2013).
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• Group 2 (Osaka)
• Group 3 (Large): Hokkaido, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Aichi, Hyogo, Fukuoka
• Group 4 (Medium): Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima,
Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma, Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka,
Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Nara, Wakayama, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Ka-
gawa, Ehime, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Okinawa
• Group 5 (Small): Others
The following interpretation may be drawn from the scatter diagram and related
coefficients of correlation shown in Fig. 5. Firstly, when seen as pool data for all
prefectures, the correlation coefficient is -0.0814, and no clear correlation can be
recognized. Even when excluding Tokyo, where there is a clear difference in level, a
strong nonlinear relationship can be seen with a boundary near where the ordinary
balance ratio is 95. In fact, the correlation coefficient when just excluding Tokyo is
calculated at -0.0379, suggesting that there is no correlation after all.
On the other hand, viewing the scatter diagram of ordinary balance ratio and
non-subsidized expense for each of the above Groups individually, a considerably
negative correlation can be confirmed, particularly in Group 5 (Small), even though
differences in level among the prefectures was easily controlled via population scale
alone. The coefficients of correlation for each are brought together in Table 8.
Moreover, as seen in Fig. 5, the FY2000 figure for Tokyo in Group 1 is clearly
an outlier. Table 8 also as shows the correlation coefficient excluding the data for
FY2000, but even then, the figure is -0.8142, revealing a strongly negative correlation
in Tokyo as well.
As shown above, with Osaka in Group 2 as an exception, a negative correlation
between non-subsidized expense and ordinary balance ratio can be confirmed. This
is thought to reflect the fact that non-subsidized expense is controlled to the extent
that fiscal administration becomes rigid. From such a simple correlation, however,
it is not possible it draw the conclusion that rigidity of fiscal affairs causes non-
subsidized expense to become procyclical to economic fluctuation. Thus, whether
the ordinary balance ratio influences the reaction to economic fluctuation by non-
subsidized expense will be investigated in the following, using the empirical approach
of Lane (2003). For comparison, subsidized expense will also be estimated at the
same time. The specific estimation procedure is as follows. As the first stage in the
estimation, the reaction of the logarithmic difference of subsidized or non-subsidized
expense (G) to the logarithmic difference of production (Y ) is measured for each
prefecture, in accordance with equation (1) in Lane (2003, p. 2667). As with Lane
(2003), the error term (uit) follows a single-level auto regression process, producing
these expressions for estimation:
∆ lnGit = γi + βi∆ lnYi,t−1 + uit
uit = ρiui,t−1 + it
However, to gauge the reaction of local governments to economic conditions, the
lag in explanatory variables was removed to resolve the problem of simultaneity, as
in the models above. Here, unlike in Fig. 5, logarithmic difference is used instead
of original units. This has the effect of controlling differences in level between
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prefectures, such as those stated above. Also, unlike the previous models, potential
differences in β between prefectures are tolerated.13
The second stage of the estimation, as shown in equation (2) of Lane (2003, p.
2668), is carried out by estimating a regression model using βˆ, estimated according to
the above expression, as an explained variable. In this analysis, the ordinary balance
ratio (ca) is included as an explanatory variable, and the following expression is used
for estimation.
βˆi = δ + η × cai + vi
In this second stage of estimation, however, a problem arises as to which temporal
value should be used for the ordinary balance ratio. That is, the ordinary balance
ratio is also influenced by business cycles every fiscal year, and the average value for
each prefecture FY2000-FY2007 has to be used. Here, to remove the influence of
outliers, it was decided that the median value would be used as a representative value
for the ordinary balance ratio in FY2000-FY2007. It should be noted, incidentally,
that the same estimation was attempted using the average ordinary balance ratio,
producing the same estimation result as when using the median.
Fig. 6 shows the estimated value of β for subsidized and non-subsidized expense.
Although there is a degree of difference among the prefectures, the median reveals
a negative value for subsidized expense and a positive one for non-subsidized ex-
pense. In other words, even when estimating β for individual prefectures, it can be
confirmed that non-subsidized expense is generally procyclical.
Fig. 7 is a scatter diagram taking cai as its horizontal axis and βˆi as its vertical
axis, and shows the regression line estimated using OLS. However, because outliers
were observed in Fig. 6, a sample with outliers removed was used. The OLS
estimated value of η yields 0.008 for subsidized expense and 0.172 for non-subsidized
expense. For subsidized expense, this is not significant when using Newey and West’s
standard error, but for non-subsidized expense it is significant at a level of 5%. This
result shows that the ordinary balance ratio exerts a positively significant influence
on the βˆ of non-subsidized expense. As such, a deterioration (rise) in the ordinary
balance ratio could be said to increase the degree of procyclical behavior by non-
subsidized expense. In other words, this means that, in regions where the degree
of fiscal rigidity is particularly strong, non-subsidized expense increases when the
economy is expanding and decreases when it is in recession.
To close this section, the results obtained from this analysis and their connection
with precedent research will be stated. Firstly, Miyazaki (2008, 2009a, b) show that
public investment by local governments makes no contribution to the stability of
the macro economy. It may be concluded that one reason for this is that non-
subsidized expense is not linked to the macro economy. Miyazaki (2008) proposes
three possibilities to explain why public investment by local governments does not
yield fiscal stimulus effects, namely (1) the content of public investment by local
governments, (2) reduction in private demand caused by rising interest rates, and (3)
the effect of substituting private consumption. Of these, Miyazaki (2009b) verifies
the process through rising interest rates, and indicates that this kind of transmission
process has not been observed. In Sections 3 and 4 of this paper, it was shown that
13In the previous estimation, β was assumed to be constant for all prefectures as the primary
approximation, but as discussed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), among others, β may conceiv-
ably depend on individual situations. Estimating for individual prefectures, therefore, should also
be useful as additional verification of the earlier estimation results.
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public investment by local governments is not sufficiently countercyclical to macro
economic fluctuation, as a result of non-subsidized expense. If this result were
classified under one of the three possibilities mentioned above, the problem could
be said to lie in the content of public investment by local governments.
Furthermore, on the short-term impact of public investment on local economies,
Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010), Kondo (2011) and others point out that it has only
limited effect. In particular, Miyazaki and Kondo (2012) focus on public investment
by local governments, and report that their discretionary public investment makes
local economies more subject to fluctuation. The empirical results obtained in this
analysis support these assertions made by precedent research, and may be said to
have clarified one of their causes. In other words, if it is accepted that subsidized
expense is not linked to local economies but that non-subsidized expense is procycli-
cal, public investment by local governments would inevitably not contribute to the
stability of local economies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, public investment by local governments in Japan has been divided
into subsidized and non-subsidized expense, and the differences in their respective
decision-making have been empirically studied. As summarized in Table 9, empirical
analysis based on panel data for each prefecture revealed the following differences
between subsidized and non-subsidized expense. Firstly, subsidized expense is coun-
tercyclical to the economy in the country as a whole, but no correlation with eco-
nomic fluctuation at prefectural level could be seen. Contrastingly, particularly from
the beginning of the 2000s, non-subsidized expense did not react to macro economic
circumstances, i.e. the state of the economy at national level or the government debt
ratio, but was shown to be procyclical to economic fluctuation at prefectural level.
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that this procyclical behavior of non-subsidized
expense is caused by the fiscal rigidity of local governments.
Summarizing these results in terms of economic stabilization, the following state-
ments can be made. Firstly, subsidized expense strongly reflects central government
decision-making and displays countercyclical trends with a view to stabilizing the
macro economy. When it comes to stabilizing or supporting local economies, how-
ever, it is not necessarily implemented in a way that offsets business cycles. Non-
subsidized expense, meanwhile, is more strongly impacted by the freedom of local
finances than by central decision-making, and as a result is not linked to the macro
economy. Not only that, but at prefectural level it is, if anything, implemented in a
way that amplifies economic fluctuation. In that most of Japan’s public investment
is implemented by local governments, as a problem prior to that of evaluating its
policy effects, it has become clear that it is not implemented with adequate timing
to offset business cycles in the first place. It follows that the effect of fiscal stimulus
measure is, if any, small during the lost decades in Japan.
The main research tasks that remain are as follows. Firstly, when exploring the
factors behind procyclical non-subsidized expense, not enough study has been made
on the appropriateness of using a median or average value for the ordinary balance
ratio during the sample period. Particularly in some prefectures, the ordinary bal-
ance ratio fluctuates greatly during the period in question, causing a need for an
alternative approach and additional verification. Also, fiscal policies in particular
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are accompanied by an implementation lag, but this point has not been examined.
Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation of public investment by local governments
will require issues such as chronological changes in the weighting of subsidized and
non-subsidized expense to be considered. These are seen as tasks for the future.
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Figure 1: Ordinary Construction Expenditure
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Figure 2: Scatter Diagrams of Rates of Increase in the initial Local Public Finance
Program, the revised Local Public Finance Program, and Revised Settled Accounts
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Figure 3: Subsidized Expense
(a) Rate of Year-on-year Increase in Subsidized Expense
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Figure 4: Non-subsidized Expense
(a)Rate of Year-on-year Increase in Non-subsidized Expense
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Figure 5: Ordinary Balance Ratio and Non-subsidized Expense (1 billion yen)
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Figure 6: β Estimation Results
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Figure 7: βˆi and the Ordinary Balance Ratio
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Table 1: Empirical Analysis on Public Investment in Japan
Policy effects (Demand aspects) Determinant factors
Macro data Bayoumi (2001) Doi (1998)
Ihori et al. (2003) Kitasaka (2008)
*Miyazaki (2008, 2009a, b) *Kondo (2008)
Local data Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2010) *Kondo (2008)
Kondo (2011) Funashima (2013)
Miyazaki (2011) *This research
*Miyazaki and Kondo (2012)
Note: * Research involving analysis aimed mainly at public investment by local
governments.
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Table 5: Correlation with the Indexes of Business Conditions
(a)Whole Sample
CI DI t1 t2 t3 h1 h2 h3 sum1 sum2 sum3
CI 1.0000
DI 0.8767 1.0000
t1 -0.0502 -0.1131 1.0000
t2 -0.2359 -0.2690 0.9216 1.0000
t3 -0.0268 -0.0705 0.6955 0.7700 1.0000
h1 0.0565 -0.0832 0.8397 0.7760 0.5633 1.0000
h2 -0.4663 -0.4266 0.2512 0.3850 0.4036 0.1018 1.0000
h3 -0.4852 -0.4524 0.2642 0.4131 0.4194 0.1174 0.9946 1.0000
sum1 -0.0335 -0.1159 0.9907 0.9118 0.6705 0.9042 0.2250 0.2390 1.0000
sum2 -0.4360 -0.4304 0.6828 0.8163 0.6913 0.5071 0.8436 0.8550 0.6608 1.0000
sum3 -0.3520 -0.3531 0.5364 0.6772 0.8058 0.3626 0.8621 0.8726 0.5041 0.9265 1.0000
(b)Excluding FY1995
CI DI t1 t2 t3 h1 h2 h3 sum1 sum2 sum3
CI 1.0000
DI 0.8805 1.0000
t1 -0.0600 -0.1125 1.0000
t2 -0.2460 -0.2693 0.9208 1.0000
t3 -0.0291 -0.0702 0.6972 0.7714 1.0000
h1 0.0420 -0.0826 0.8387 0.7749 0.5688 1.0000
h2 -0.5593 -0.4688 0.2251 0.3813 0.4355 0.0204 1.0000
h3 -0.5981 -0.5090 0.2401 0.4179 0.4627 0.0300 0.9945 1.0000
sum1 -0.0457 -0.1155 0.9910 0.9114 0.6738 0.9025 0.1822 0.1959 1.0000
sum2 -0.4902 -0.4512 0.6871 0.8329 0.7217 0.4793 0.8248 0.8423 0.6561 1.0000
sum3 -0.3968 -0.3674 0.5301 0.6826 0.8379 0.3253 0.8505 0.8685 0.4884 0.9186 1.0000
Notes: t1: Non-subsidized (initial program), t2: Non-subsidized (revised program), t3:
Non-subsidized (revised settled accounts), h1: Subsidized (initial program), h2:
Subsidized (revised program), h3: Subsidized (revised settled accounts), sum1: Ordinary
construction expenditure (initial program), sum2: Ordinary construction expenditure
(revised program), sum3: Ordinary construction expenditure (revised settled accounts)
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Table 6: Public Investment Function Estimation Results (FY1992-FY1999)
∆ ln (subsidized expense) ∆ ln (non-subsidized expense)
Model (I) (II) (I) (II)
Constant 19.900∗∗∗ 3.502∗∗∗ 18.599∗∗∗ 2.698∗∗∗
(2.396) (0.367) (2.766) (0.222)
Prefectural-level variable:
∆ ln (gross prefectural product) −0.160 0.238 0.454 0.164
(0.188) (0.283) (0.316) (0.180)
Great Hanshin-Awaji 39.470∗∗∗ 32.275∗∗∗ 9.772∗∗∗ 2.457
Earthquake dummy (2.730) (4.190) (3.332) (3.814)
National-level variable:
∆ ln (gross domestic product) −3.213∗∗∗ —– −0.268 —–
(1.096) (1.462)
∆ ln (government debt ratio) −1.963∗∗∗ —– −2.443∗∗∗ —–
(0.229) (0.354)
Observations 376 376 376 376
R2 0.503 0.635 0.553 0.615
Notes: *, ** and *** show the null hypothesis rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively. Figures in parentheses indicate White’s standard error.
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Table 7: Public Investment Function Estimation Results (FY2000-FY2007)
∆ ln (subsidized expense) ∆ ln (non-subsidized expense)
Model (I) (II) (I) (II)
Constant −6.816∗ −11.271∗∗∗ −13.042∗∗∗ −10.167∗∗∗
(3.849) (0.370) (3.220) (0.359)
Prefectural-level variable:
∆ ln (gross prefectural product) 0.257 −0.115 0.786∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.264) (0.256) (0.256)
National-level variable:
∆ ln (gross domestic product) −2.773∗∗ —– 0.782 —–
(1.327) (1.325)
∆ ln (government debt ratio) −0.158 —– 0.227 —–
(0.318) (0.216)
Observations 470 470 470 470
R2 0.149 0.260 0.105 0.120
Notes: *, ** and *** show the null hypothesis rejected at significant levels of 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively. Figures in parentheses indicate White’s standard error.
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Table 8: Correlation Coefficient between Ordinary Balance Ratio and Non-
subsidized Expense by Group
Group
1 (Tokyo) −0.0797
1 (Tokyo, except FY2000) −0.8142
2 (Osaka) 0.4837
3 (Large) −0.2725
4 (Medium) −0.4128
5 (Small) −0.6864
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Table 9: Reaction of Public Investment to Economic Fluctuation
Economic fluctuation
Country as a whole Prefectures
Subsidized expense Countercyclical
Non-subsidized expense Procyclical
35
